From 3a223ca3ebc7ac24d7726a0cd58e5695bc813657 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 21:00:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2018-5704: Prevent some forms of Cross Protocol Scripting
 attacks

OpenOCD can be targeted by a Cross Protocol Scripting attack from
a web browser running malicious code, such as the following PoC:

var x = new XMLHttpRequest();
x.open("POST", "http://127.0.0.1:4444", true);
x.send("exec xcalc\r\n");

This mitigation should provide some protection from browser-based
attacks and is based on the corresponding fix in Redis:

https://github.com/antirez/redis/blob/8075572207b5aebb1385c4f233f5302544439325/src/networking.c#L1758


Upstream-status: Under review: http://openocd.zylin.com/#/c/4335/
Change-Id: Ia96ebe19b74b5805dc228bf7364c7971a90a4581
Signed-off-by: Andreas Fritiofson <andreas.fritiofson@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Josef Gajdusek <atx@atx.name>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
 src/server/startup.tcl | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/server/startup.tcl b/src/server/startup.tcl
index 64ace407..dd1b31e4 100644
--- a/src/server/startup.tcl
+++ b/src/server/startup.tcl
@@ -8,3 +8,14 @@ proc ocd_gdb_restart {target_id} {
 	# one target
 	reset halt
 }
+
+proc prevent_cps {} {
+	echo "Possible SECURITY ATTACK detected."
+	echo "It looks like somebody is sending POST or Host: commands to OpenOCD."
+	echo "This is likely due to an attacker attempting to use Cross Protocol Scripting"
+	echo "to compromise your OpenOCD instance. Connection aborted."
+	exit
+}
+
+proc POST {args} { prevent_cps }
+proc Host: {args} { prevent_cps }
-- 
2.11.0

